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FOREWORD
What does NATO bring to U.S. national security in practical terms?
This rhetorical question seeks not so much to provoke debate than to
invoke NATO’s potential. In the post-Cold War era, especially during
the war on terrorism, NATO’s raison d’être must expand beyond
securing the immediate borders of member states.
In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines
America’s choices regarding the basing of ground troops in Europe. He
considers three major options available to the United States—complete
withdrawal, annual rotations, and restructuring the Alliance to
accommodate a smaller U.S. presence. While weighing the advantages
and disadvantages of each option, he does not lose sight of the ultimate
objective of NATO—to provide credible land power for the full
spectrum of operations.
Lieutenant Colonel Millen has expanded his concept of the integrated
multinational division by introducing a NATO 3-3 Force Structure
concept that rests on a smaller NATO ground force adaptive to the
capabilities and wealth of member states; increases interoperability
(technologically and procedurally); and supports the expeditionary
force structure already in progress by the formal establishment of
three standing combined joint task forces (CJTF). Additionally, he
recommends the adoption of nine division-sized bases in Europe
located at key geostrategic points for greater access to the Middle East
and Africa. Indeed, the idea is daunting, but he lays out a pragmatic
approach for implementation.
One of the monograph’s strengths is not simply introducing
innovative concepts for the Alliance; the author also ensures they are
practical and within current capabilities. The reader will ﬁnd Lieutenant
Colonel Millen’s ideas provocative but compelling. The Strategic
Studies Institute is pleased to offer this insightful and controversial
monograph as a topic of debate among European security specialists
and Department of Defense.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
As the United States prosecutes the war on terrorism, it is also in
the process of adjusting its global security posture. Not surprisingly,
the American presence in Europe will be profoundly affected by the
U.S. calculations, and hence by extension, so will NATO. It is no
exaggeration that the whispered conversations within the Pentagon
reverberate within the halls of NATO headquarters, so the ultimate
decision has the potential to rock the Alliance, no matter how benign
it may appear to the United States.
The United States has three basic options regarding its future
ground presence in Europe—withdraw completely, rotate divisions,
or restructure the Alliance to permit a smaller U.S. presence.
Maintaining the status quo in Europe is not a viable option, since it
does not rectify the U.S. over-extension of forces or accommodate
the dynamics associated with the war on terrorism.
A withdrawal from Europe permits the consolidation of ground
forces in the United States for power projection missions globally.
Because the United States maintains relatively modern divisionsized posts with contiguous maneuver training areas, unit readiness
would be much higher than in Europe and certainly more cost
efﬁcient. Power projection from the United States provides greater
ﬂexibility in that the United States can rely on staging bases in
Europe and elsewhere (“Lily Pads”) en route to trouble spots.
Unfortunately, a withdrawal will likely result in a European loss of
conﬁdence in the United States and a de facto marginalizing of U.S.
leadership and inﬂuence. More disturbing, the European Union (EU)
will ﬁll the void with its Rapid Reaction Force, which will compete
with NATO for resources but fail to live up to expectations. In the
end, the Alliance will not likely survive the trauma.
The rotation of divisions has the advantage of maintaining
power projection ﬂexibility without endangering U.S. commitment
to the Alliance. However, given the enormous effort and associated
costs for preparation, staging, moving, and reception, this
option is incredibly expensive and time consuming. Given that
rotations traditionally involve three units (those preparing, those
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deployed, and those recovering), require extensive organizational
reconﬁguration for the mission, and present a host of logistical and
administrative challenges, this option is impractical. It might look
good on paper, but would needlessly distract the Army from more
important matters.
Restructuring the Alliance to accommodate fewer and smaller
units presents signiﬁcant opportunities despite the initial challenges
and visceral resistance. As opposed to the dozens of ill-equipped
and undermanned divisions and brigades currently comprising
NATO, a restructuring to nine integrated multinational divisions
is in order. (See Table 2, page 17.) Organized into three permanent
combined joint task forces with three divisions each, along with an
allotment of specialized units at the CJTF level (NATO 3-3 Force
Structure), Alliance members would contribute fully modern and
manned forces in accordance with their capabilities and wealth.
Because of the relatively small size of the new force structure, each
member would contribute only four to ﬁve battalions or brigades to
the Alliance.
In connection with restructuring, NATO should modernize its
concept of unit stationing. Rather than relying on the 19th century
concept of small casernes scattered throughout Europe, the Alliance
should establish nine division-sized posts at geostrategic locations.
Because each post would also require a contiguous maneuver training
area as well as modern facilities, NATO should solicit members to
compete for the contracts giving relative value to location, available
land, and potential for modernization. Sufﬁcient time is required for
member states to hold referendums and select sites for the bases. The
construction and other associated costs for new bases will be offset
by the closures and sales of hundreds of obsolete casernes as well as
the energy and maintenance savings with modern facilities.
The NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized bases ﬁts
perfectly with the new NATO Military Command Structure and
NATO Response Force. Most importantly, the NATO 3-3 Force
Structure provides a standing force for force generation, currently
a long and tedious process within the Alliance. Integrated
multinational divisions permit all NATO members to make a
meaningful contribution and increase the interoperability (both
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technologically and procedurally) between the United States and its
allies.
Recommendations:
• Adopt the NATO 3-3 Force Structure.
• Establish a NATO working group to explore nine division-sized
bases.
• Adopt a public awareness campaign to inform member states
of the need for a NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized
bases.
• Withdraw U.S. political support of, and a priori support of, the
use of NATO assets for the EU Rapid Reaction Force.
The United States can have its cake and eat it too without appearing
unilateralist. The United States needs a power security partner, and
any decision which endangers that need will be to U.S. detriment. The
implementation of these long-term recommendations will provide
the Alliance with a powerful, sustainable expeditionary force and
signiﬁcantly ease the security burden on the United States.
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RECONFIGURING THE AMERICAN
MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Introduction.
The United States and Europe are approaching a crossroads
regarding common security interests. After the world wars of
the 20th century, culminating in a cold war, few national security
specialists in the United States would argue that the stability of
Europe is not an enduring U.S. national security objective. In the
same vain, while the European elite may wrinkle its collective nose
at U.S. approaches to foreign policy, particularly with regard to the
U.S. preference for the Big Stick approach, few in Europe would
dispute the stabilizing beneﬁts of American power.
As America deﬁnes its new security posture vis-à-vis Europe,
the issue of continued U.S. military presence in Europe will have
enormous strategic implications within the Alliance. The United
States has three basic options regarding its future presence in
Europe--withdraw completely, rotate divisions for annual tours, or
restructure the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence.
The United States could exercise the option of status quo,
meaning it maintains its presence more or less intact, even if this
includes shifting ground forces farther east and southeast for closer
proximity to the Middle East. This option does nothing to address
U.S. global security concerns or the war on terror. As the number
of these concerns, operations, and missions expand without a
concomitant increase in the size of the military, existing regional
commitments in Europe and Korea need to be revisited. Sooner or
later something has to give, and if the United States missteps in its
approach, the whole security apparatus, to include NATO, could
collapse. Pragmatically, the status quo approach resolves nothing.
The three options provide the United States with the opportunity
to harness existing resources more efﬁciently. As this monograph
addresses these choices, it explores their effect on U.S.-NATO
relations, on NATO readiness, and on long-term cost beneﬁts.
Naturally, a failure to strike a balance among these issues may result
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in unintended consequences, causing irreparable damage to the
Alliance. The intent of this monograph is to explore the pros and
cons of the ﬁrst two options as a lead in to the third and preferred
option. This option intentionally ignores existing U.S.-European
Union (EU) initiatives, agendas, and frictions to get to the heart of
the argument. Most of the obstacles go beyond the scope of this
monograph and tend to obfuscate the basic need for change.
In discussing the reconﬁguration of U.S. ground forces in Europe,
the reconﬁguration of NATO must also occur. Both go hand-inhand and represent the most profound way to redress U.S. strategic
concerns as well as enduring problems within the Alliance.
Withdrawal from Europe.
A complete withdrawal of ground forces from Europe constitutes
the most traumatic option for the health of the Alliance. Relying on
its robust power projection capabilities, the United States would
conceptually use select bases in Europe for the staging of ground
and air forces to a crisis region. These bases would serve for interim
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of combined
joint task forces (CJTF). Ground forces would also use available time
at these bases to train on speciﬁc mission essential tasks. The use
of way stations, sometimes called “lily pads,” presents the United
States with substantial advantages.
Consolidation of ground forces in the United States permits
greater strategic ﬂexibility for power projection. Given the limited
available ground forces and growing global responsibilities,
maintaining as many forces as possible in the homeland allows
the United States to concentrate strategic air- and sea-lift for rapid
projection of forces to any point in the world.
The U.S. basing of units also obviates the reliance on European
states for support of a diplomatically contentious operation. For
instance, ground units stationed in Germany could be immobilized
if the German government demonstrated its opposition to a military
operation by denying or delaying the use of airspace, rail, airbases,
and seaports, despite treaty obligations. Additionally, other
European neighbors to Germany, such as Austria, Switzerland,
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and France, could complicate deployments by denying the use
of airspace either as an invocation of neutrality or as a sign of
displeasure regarding U.S. policy. As the EU gains prominence
and given that it is often at loggerheads with the United States over
virtually every issue, the problem of cooperation in Europe likely
will grow. Even though obstructionist governments could derail
the “lily pad” option as well, the United States would retain the
ﬂexibility to bypass Europe.
Division readiness would beneﬁt from home stationing as well.
Although Germany offers extraordinary personal and professional
rewards, military service in Germany can be a trial. Decaying
living and work facilities in pre-World War II casernes require
vast expenditures for maintenance and renovation. Even though it
would be cheaper in the long run to raze existing casernes and build
anew, this option has never been exercised adequately. Living and
working conditions remain spartan and demoralizing, especially
when soldiers happen to see the modern German casernes.
The scattering of brigade and smaller units throughout Germany
in small casernes hampers coordination, training, and logistics,
as well as creating to a redundancy in supply and administrative
services. Training and readiness issues suffer the most though. Few
casernes possess a maneuver training area. The vast majority of units
must conduct annual training (sometimes less often) at Grafenwöhr,
Hohenfels, or Baumholder for range qualiﬁcation and some
maneuver exercise training. Far from routine, unit rotations to these
training areas require extensive preparation. Weeks of coordination
and preparation are required for rail movement, wheeled convoys,
inprocessing (establishing ammunition and supply accounts,
signing for billets and maintenance facilities, drawing ammunition,
and range control certiﬁcation), and outprocessing (clearing the
above accounts, cleaning and turning in issued property and items,
initiating property accountability procedures, and billets and
maintenance facility inspections), and rail and convoy deployment
back to home station. Under this morass of bureaucracy, less time
and effort is spent on training than getting to the training areas and
back.
With the end of the Cold War, exercises in the German
countryside are practically nonexistent. German environmental
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concerns, payments for maneuver damage, maneuver restrictions,
and the danger to civilians are too great to make them worthwhile.
In contrast to Germany, American posts accommodate whole
divisions with contiguous, large maneuver training areas. None of
the obstacles that hamstring units in Germany applies. Hence, unit
readiness in the United States is considerably higher.
Withdrawal from Europe carries signiﬁcant strategic drawbacks
though. Despite the advantages of basing ground forces in the
United States, the effect on NATO would ultimately prove more
deleterious to U.S. national security because it would directly affect
the U.S. relationship with all NATO nations. Critics, who continue
to harp on the lack of threat brought about by the fall of the Soviet
empire, are intellectually mired in the Cold War. That the NATO
Alliance no longer serves its original purpose is self-evident: from
collective self-defense to the defense of collective interests. NATO
has and continues to realign its vision, missions, and structure to
address the new strategic realities. Simply put, NATO is no longer
just a security umbrella for the protection of Europe; its shade has
extended beyond. Just as the wheel has evolved exponentially
beyond the original intent of its inventor, NATO has evolved beyond
the wildest dreams of its creators.
The presence of U.S. ground troops in Europe represents a tangible
U.S. commitment to NATO. The manner of this commitment differs
greatly than the original design. Initially, the United States provided
the air power (and by implication the nuclear umbrella), the United
Kingdom—the sea power—and continental Europe—the land
power. The complacency of the continental land powers (including
the problems associated with rearming Germany) and the Soviet
acquisition of the atomic bomb confounded this security arrangement
should the Soviets invade. So the United States stationed permanent
ground troops (initially four divisions) in Germany as a trip wire to
deter Soviet fait accompli invasion stratagems.1
American ground presence not only assured Europeans of the
U.S. commitment; it also enhanced the inﬂuence of the United States
in European security matters and engendered a binding trust in
America among the allies. Admittedly, in terms of military power,
U.S. air and naval power in Europe was substantial; nevertheless
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these forces were not as visible to the Europeans as ground forces,
and because these forces could withdraw quickly out of harm’s way,
their assurance to the Europeans could never match the presence of
ground troops. Hence psychologically, U.S. ground forces provided
greater security to the European psyche.
Had NATO and the United States not weathered a slew of crises
together—Suez, 1956; Hungary, 1956; Berlin, 1961; France, 1967;
Czechoslovakia, 1968; and Soviet saber rattling throughout the 1970s
and 1980s—perhaps the issue of ground forces would be minor. But
the fact remains, U.S. ground forces’ presence during these events
reassured Europeans that American commitment through NATO
remained stalwart. At this stage in the relationship, a withdrawal in
any form (e.g., further reductions) represents a deﬁnitive break from
the Alliance, a separation presaging the ﬁnal divorce. To a continent
steeped in diplomatic cynicism, American assurances to the contrary
are meaningless.
U.S. ground forces and headquarters stationed in the United
States will certainly remain declared to NATO, but as other crises,
national security concerns, and shifting priorities surface, the United
States will become inattentive to Europe. U.S. participation in future
NATO military operations would likely devolve to the Air Force or
at best, an ad hoc arrangement with a U.S. Joint Task Force operating
independently. Once U.S. ground forces are separated from their
European counterparts, interoperability will decay. In a crisis,
little time will be available for reacquaintance; hence the degree of
cooperation will be limited.
Inevitably, Europe will distance itself from the United States as
well. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) proponents
will pounce on any opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in
Europe, and a withdrawal would serve as a pretext to advance the
EU agenda.
Because space abhors a vacuum, pan European politicos will use
the withdrawal to advance their EU Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF)
initiative. For those unfamiliar with EU foreign policy, the EU RRF
appears as a pragmatic and necessary force to revitalize European
militaries. Professed as a fully modern, interoperable, expeditionary
force of 60,000 troops, the EU RRF would play a larger role in coalition
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warfare and shoulder an equitable burden of military expenditures
with the United States. As with prior European military ventures,
the devil has always been in the details. Two enduring security
matters plague the EU—inattentiveness to military readiness and
embryonic federal institutions.
As the headline goal for the establishment of the EU RRF was
2003, European rhetoric has overreached badly. To date, the idea
of a European expeditionary force is more ﬁgment than reality.2 In
addition to insufﬁcient troop strength, the EU RRF lacks adequate
numbers of precision weapons, refueling aircraft, surveillance
equipment, secure communications, and intra-theater airlift; and
acquisition of these are at least a decade away. U.S. Ambassador to
NATO R. Nicholson Burns has repeatedly warned that the European
contribution to modern military operations will remain meager for
years.3 European assurances regarding progress in the ﬁeld of
modernization are cold gruel for the United States, which must
shoulder the security burden while Europe ambles along.
Of all the military deﬁciencies, airlift capabilities are the most
pertinent. Power projection deﬁnes the added value a nation
brings to modern security alliances, and the issue of credible airlift
capabilities directly affects Europe’s caliber of deterrence. As long as
EU power projection capabilities remain mediocre, the use of a force
mechanism, which is integral to deterrence, is missing. Adversarial
parties may be willing to conduct talks with the EU, but they will not
take them seriously. Moreover, without the ability to conduct initial
entry operations, the EU RRF brings no added value to the United
States in times of crisis. What practical reason is there for the United
States to engage in coalition building with the EU?4
EU political institutions grant no mechanism for the rapid
deployment of forces. European states show neither the desire
nor the inclination to surrender their foreign policy to a central
European polity. European ministries require months of debate
before even agreeing to deploy forces.5 Without a central federal
authority, unencumbered by consensus mechanisms, the potential
rapid capabilities of the EU RRF will remain irrelevant. European
federalists seek salvation in the common foreign and security policy,
but this pursuit ignores Europe’s fundamental problems—trust

6

and conﬁdence. It would truly be a wonder if Europe progressed
politically beyond a loose confederation of states, given its historical
baggage of inveterate mutual suspicions honed by centuries of
intrigue and betrayal. On the other hand, the United States, through
NATO, has a remarkable record of instilling common cause that no
other European state has duplicated.6 The absence of U.S. ground
forces in Europe risks marginalizing the U.S. leadership, and left to
its own devices, the EU is unlikely to become a trustworthy security
partner.
The belief that the EU RRF will ultimately beneﬁt NATO is
illusory and detrimental to the Alliance. The hope that the EU
RRF will become the European security pillar under NATO is
fraught with risks. If ESDP advocates are less than candid about
their intentions, the EU RRF will act as a Trojan horse, infecting the
Alliance and destroying it from within. The EU diversion of scarce
military spending from domestic military forces to fund ESDP and
the frequent attempts to establish separate headquarters speak
volumes regarding intent.7 Since the vast majority of NATO EU
countries’ military expenditures fall far below the 2.0 percent of GDP
requirement, the diversion of resources has a marked impact on
the military readiness of NATO units.8 The fundamental question
remains whether the EU RRF will be available for NATO missions—
unlikely.
The EU is committed to the Petersberg Tasks charter, which
deals exclusively with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping
tasks, and crisis management, including peacekeeping.9 Once the
EU RRF begins deploying on these missions, its availability as an
expeditionary force for NATO is diminished. The EU RRF will
depend largely on NATO support (command and control, airlift,
combat support, and combat service support) for some time.10
Given that most deployments in support of the Petersberg Tasks
will require an enduring presence, a substantial number of units will
be involved in preparation, deployment, and recovery. Hence, not
only will the EU RRF compete with NATO for scarce resources, but
it will also consume NATO resources in the process.
The temptation for the EU to use the RRF as a counterbalance to
U.S. power is alarming and not unfounded. The EU, more enamored
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with diplomacy and incentives, placing its “faith in international
institutions, regimes and norms to tackle problems of common
concern,”11 could use the EU RRF as a political weapon to stymie
U.S. foreign policy. By denying NATO the use of the EU RRF during
a crisis, the EU would have a political sledgehammer to humiliate
and undermine the United States. Traditionally, the United States
prefers to build coalitions bilaterally with NATO members during
crises, so the impact of RRF denial would purely political. To
counter this approach, France has introduced provisions in the EU
draft constitution that prohibit bilateral agreements between the
United States and individual EU states. In essence, EU member
states would be compelled to adhere to the EU common foreign
and security policy, preventing direct negotiations with the United
States.12 Naturally, the EU seeks to form a solid political bloc, and
EU enthusiasts would like nothing better than to dismantle the
one organization from which the United States wields tremendous
inﬂuence—NATO. As U.S. Ambassador Burns opines, “Their vision
of Europe as a countervailing power to the United States is one that
would destroy the cooperative spirit that has held us together in
NATO.”13
The danger posed by a complete withdrawal of ground troops
from Europe is such that many Europeans may view it as a harbinger
of complete U.S. detachment from the Alliance. The temptation
will be great for EU advocates to ﬁll the void with the EU RRF.
Disturbingly, given the dearth of forces, funding, and resources,
the EU RRF will not be able to ﬁll the U.S. boots. It follows that the
EU will clamor for a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR); after all, with no U.S. presence, what need is there for
an American SACEUR? Europe’s demonstrated inattentiveness to
military expenditures and modernization combined with the sole
pursuit of Petersberg Tasks and the insidious policy of fettering
the United States will result in an enervation of the Alliance and
eventually its dissolution. Consolidating U.S. forces in the United
States appears to make good military sense on paper, but in the end,
the United States will ﬁnd itself shouldering more of the security
burden than ever before.
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The Annual Rotation of Divisions.
While not as drastic as a complete withdrawal, the adoption of
a rotation policy represents a compromise of sorts. Although still
highly speculative, the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions could
rotate to the United States once their deployment in Iraq ends in 2004
and 2006, respectively. It follows that the families and a number of
civilian contractors would also move to the new home stations for
both divisions.
This option is not without substantial beneﬁts for the Army. At
some point, the United States will begin the rotation of divisions to
Europe for 1-year tours. Without family members, the logistical
footprint (i.e., travel, moving, family housing, shopping facilities,
schools, etc.) will no longer be a factor and result in increased
savings for the military.
Beneﬁting from the insights gained from the stationing of troops
in Germany, the United States should negotiate with potential
host countries for division-sized posts with contiguous and large
maneuver training areas. Additionally, the posts should have
modern living and work facilities as well as land set aside for
further expansion projects (simulation centers, additional ranges,
urban combat centers, etc.). Granted, the expenses associated with
building a new post are worth debating, and some points bear
noting. Without family members and the attendant infrastructure
requirements, the number of facilities would be drastically smaller
than the norm. NATO pays for 75 percent of construction costs,
with the United States footing 25 percent of the bill.14 Assuming
an enduring commitment to NATO, the initial expense of new
facilities would become offset over time as a result of energy savings
and lowered upkeep requirements. Moreover, the cost savings of
training in the maneuver training area as opposed to deploying to a
training area will pay for itself. More importantly, U.S. units would
enjoy the same training opportunities as their sister units in the
United States.
European NATO members are unlikely to split hairs over annual
rotations or permanent basing. As long as the United States maintains
a ground presence in Europe, the Alliance will have tangible proof of
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U.S. commitment, securing U.S. inﬂuence and leadership.
Despite its merits, annual rotations leave some problems
unresolved and indeed raise new ones that question their
practicability. The insights gleaned from rotations to the Sinai,
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, suggest that, for every division
deployed, two are tied up either in preparation for or recovery
from the deployment. The noun “bureaucracy” may have French
origins, but the U.S. Army made it profound. At a minimum, a
division designated to rotate to Europe will begin the planning and
preparation 6 months prior to deployment. Multiple command and
staff recons (battalion to division) to the host station are a necessity.
Preparation for oversees movement (POM) entails a myriad of details
that consume a division’s time and resources to include activation of
family support groups, designation of the rear detachment chain of
command, identiﬁcation of nondeployable soldiers and requests
for ﬁllers (the inevitable replacements for nondeployable soldiers),
family care plans, palletizing personal and unit equipment, and
processing through the Program Objective Management (POM) site,
to name just a few key activities.
As an aside, any thought of reducing the rotations below a
year doubles the number of divisions preparing or recovering
from rotations. With an Army of ten divisions, this option is not
sustainable.
The disparity in the types of U.S. divisions makes annual rotations
particularly problematic.15 The Modiﬁed Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) for each division is unique; hence a deploying
division cannot simply assume control of its predecessor’s
equipment. It really is like mixing apples and oranges, and leaves
the Army with options that cause more problems than solutions.
Divisions could deploy with all their equipment to Europe,
which is cost prohibitive and time consuming.
Once one
calculates the round-trip movement costs—rail transportation to
a seaport of debarkation, loading onto ships, sea transportation,
air transportation, off-loading at the seaport of embarkation, and
rail movement to their station—the Army annual budget rises
exponentially. Factoring in a conservative movement time of 6
weeks and approximately 1 month for maintenance recovery, a
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division consumes about 9 months in preparation and movement.
No doubt, divisional units will continue a modicum level of training
throughout, but the combat effectiveness of a division would remain
an area of concern during and after a rotation.
The Army could adopt a standardized “European” division
MTOE, which would require a reorganization of the division for
the European MTOE. For each division earmarked for rotation,
reorganization would add at least 2 more months of preparation
time in order to request personnel from other units to ﬁll the MTOE
positions and to identify the personnel who cannot deploy because
they are either excess or nonapplicable to the MTOE. Describing this
process is not nearly as confusing as executing it. To make matters
more complicated, if that is possible, a period of extensive train up
for the entire division would be required. Assuming the European
MTOE would be an armored or mechanized division, light infantry
divisions (82nd, 101st, 25th, and 10th Mountain) would need to
learn how to command and control armored and mechanized units
as well as master maintenance and supply procedures. Add another
4 months to the preparation time. Since light infantry has neither
the inclination nor the desire to operate as a mechanized force, the
equipment status ratings of the division would plummet under its
tutelage.16 The most pragmatic course would be to use the heavy
divisions (3rd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and
1st Armored Division) for rotations. Despite variations in MTOE,
they are more aligned to execute rotations with the least internal
turbulence.
Using a light or eventual medium division MTOE in Europe
would carry strategic disadvantages for the United States. Given
that the light forces are the ﬁrst responders for global crises, in terms
of strategic lift, they are far easier to deploy from the United States
than elsewhere, particularly for the Paciﬁc Rim region.
The option of just rotating brigades into Europe does not resolve
the inherent problems. Preparation and realignment requirements
will not diminish, and cobbling together brigades and support units
for the rotation will require a fair amount of time before they become
cohesive. Assuming that the division headquarters at home station
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and the host nation remain stationary, both will need to expend
inordinate amounts of time in the logistical and administrative
movements of rotating their brigades and supporting units. If
the idea is simply to rotate independent brigades to Europe, then
each will require its own support package--hardly an efﬁcient use
of limited resources. This option only makes sense if the Army
converts to an independent brigade-based organization, hence
eliminating division headquarters. Until that happens however, the
brigade rotation option will lead to redundancies and infrastructure
requirements that currently plague the Army in Europe.
Of course, rotations cannot be implemented in a vacuum.
Existing security obligations (Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to
date), limit the availability of divisions and, more importantly, the
command headquarters. The result would be an army in perpetual
deployment, with soldiers spending an exorbitant amount of time
away from their families. In time, this problem would self-correct—
just as soon as all the divorces are ﬁnalized—but then again, the
retention issue might raise its ugly head.
The rotation system carries implications for the Alliance as well.
One of the strengths of the Army system lies in the family community.
Military families bring a sense of cohesiveness that transcends
other professions. The family community also draws U.S. forces
indeﬁnably closer to the host communities. Daily contacts through
mutual sports events, schools, business, employment, shopping,
and sightseeing create bonds. Absent the family community, host
countries are unlikely to form a special relationship with their U.S.
partners. To be sure, they will not enjoy the economic beneﬁts or the
cultural exchange opportunities. In short, U.S. forces would remain
one step removed from an occupation force, no matter how benign.
Rotating divisions is not just a challenge—the euphemistic
“opportunity to succeed” that Army commanders enjoy saying
when given a particularly difﬁcult task—it is a bad idea. As with
total withdrawal, it sends a message that the United States is trying
to ﬁnd a way, step-by-step, to disengage itself from the Alliance.
More importantly, it does not solve the fundamental problems that
have plagued the Alliance since the end of the Cold War—burden
sharing.
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The Challenge for the United States in Europe.
The question of whether to withdraw or rotate ground troops
does not address the basic problem confronting the United States visà-vis Europe. Namely, the United States must ensure its leadership
and inﬂuence in Europe remain solid; it must reduce its presence in
Europe as part of its global realignment, but do so without risking its
commitment to Europe; and it must ﬁnd a way to make the Alliance
more effective militarily so it can actively participate in ground
operations.
For some time now, the United States has shouldered the
lion’s share of the military burden because of an imbalance in
interoperability. This is partly technical, but a large part of it is also
procedural. The key to working more closely does not lie solely with
compatible equipment, munitions, and repair parts; to operate as a
team, partner units need to train with one another regularly. The
geographic separation of Alliance military units remains a major
obstacle to greater cooperation.
Adoption of a New NATO Force Structure.
The United States must fundamentally change the way it
operates within NATO. The U.S. Army cannot charge ahead with
Transformation and then carp about its NATO partner militaries
not carrying their own weight. NATO European nations are not
inclined to spend more money on the military, at least not in a way
which will beneﬁt the Alliance. To achieve greater integration and
interoperability and a greater degree of allied cooperation in NATO
operations, the Alliance must organize into permanent integrated
divisions.
Permanent multinational integrated divisions provide numerous
beneﬁts to the Alliance as an expeditionary force and to the United
States for burdensharing. Under this concept, NATO can downsize
to nine divisions, resulting in an overall savings of millions of dollars
per year. The Alliance can direct this money towards modernization
and the establishment of nine division-sized posts. This size force
is more than adequate to address most security threats immediately,
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and would permit the Alliance to mobilize. Integrated divisions
permit all members to contribute to NATO operations automatically,
eliminating the need to build coalitions of the willing and resort to
the tedious and time intensive force generation process. At the
national level, integrated divisions negate the practice of passive
nonparticipation in NATO missions. Participation is automatic
unless individual partners actively opt not to participate. Exercising
nonparticipation places a heavy political burden on a member state
to declare publicly the reasons for withdrawing from the mission.
The onus for taking such a stance weighs particularly heavy on a
state since it carries with it diplomatic consequences. Breaking faith
with the Alliance and risking political isolation would cause even the
most obstreperous members to pause before crossing the Rubicon.
At the national level, the member state contribution would
represent only a small part of the national army. Because NATO
would only be concerned with the quality of the contributed force,
the readiness of a partner state’s remaining armed forces is of no
import to the Alliance, nor is the overall level of gross domestic
product (GDP) committed to military expenditures. A member
state’s military contribution to NATO would be a factor of its wealth,
population size, and military capabilities (Table 1). Member states
must ensure their military contribution is compatible with the rest of
NATO, as well as fully manned, equipped, and modernized.
For collective defense to be truly equitable and effective, the
larger and wealthier partners must bear the greater burden, but as
the table shows, the burden is not onerous. The United States proves
the exception because of its global responsibilities and stationing.
Still, the U.S. contribution is measured in brigades, not to mention
Special Operating Forces and headquarters not included in the
table.
The new NATO force structure requires an expeditionary
capability with the ﬂexibility to task-organize according to the
mission before deploying. A CJTF conﬁguration with permanent
CJTF headquarters is appropriate. The expeditionary qualities of
a permanent CJTF forces NATO to train, think, and operate as a
cohesive entity. If NATO can train as a CJTF, it will ﬁght as a CJTF.
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Country

Population
(in 000’s)
2002

GDP (PPP
in Billions of
U.S. $) 2002

GDP per
Capita
(PPP). a

Active
Force b

Military
Contribution

Belgium

10,275

297.6

29,000

39,260

5 units

Bulgaria

7,621

50.6

6,600

68,450

4 units

Canada

31,902

923.0

29,400

52,300

6 units

Czech Rep

10,257

155.9

15,300

49,450

5 units

Denmark

5,369

155.5

29,000

22,700

4 units

Estonia

1,416

15.2

10,900

5,510

4 units

France

59,766

1,540.0

25,700

260,400

6 units

Germany

83,252

2,184.0

26,600

296,000

7 units

Greece

10,645

201.1

19,000

177,600

5 units

Hungary

10,075

134.7

13,300

33,400

4 units

Iceland

279

7.7

27,100

120

Italy

57,716

1,438.0

25,000

216,800

6 units

---

Latvia

2,366

20.0

8,300

5,500

2 units

Lithuania

3,601

29.2

8,400

13,510

4 units

Luxembourg

448

20.0

44,000

900

1 unit

Netherlands

16,068

434.0

26,900

49,580

6 units

Norway

4,525

143.0

31,800

26,600

5 units

Poland

38,625

368.1

9,500

163,000

5 units

Portugal

10,084

182.0

18,000

43,600

4 units

Romania

22,317

152.7

6,800

99,200

3 units

Slovakia

5,422

66.0

12,200

26,200

3 units

c

Slovenia

1,933

36.0

18,000

9,000

3 units

Spain

40,077

828.0

20,700

177,950

4 units

Turkey

67,309

468.0

7,000

514,850

4 units

UK

59,778

1,520.0

25,300

210,450

4 units

USA

280,562

10,082.0

36,300

1,414,000

4 units

Derive by dividing GDP (PPP) by population.
IISS, The Military Balance 2002-2003.
c
Paramilitary forces.
a

b

Source: CIA, The World Fact Book, 2002, Internet, http:/www.odci.gov.cia/ publications/
fact book/ index.html.

Table 1. Military Contributions of NATO States.
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The nine divisions are organized into three permanent CJTFs
with three divisions assigned—light, medium, and light—coined the
NATO 3-3 Force Structure. With the new NATO Readiness Force,
SOF, and other government, nongovernment, and international
organizations assigned to the CJTF headquarters, the NATO 3-3
Force Structure reﬂects an alignment for the strategic environment
(Table 2).
The formal assignment of a multinational Special Forces battalion
provides unique capabilities to the CJTF. Special Forces are critical
for shaping success in an unstable or crisis region. Often deployed
into troubled regions well in advance, these forces gain an intimate
understanding of unique issues and impart their insights to the CJTF
command and staff, which in turn can conduct mission planning
and preparation as a contingency. Because virtually every country
has Special Operating Forces, each of which bring niche capabilities
and skills, it is worth exploring forming SF multinational battalions,
permitting a greater sharing of skills, ideas, and experiences.
Reconﬁguring into integrated multinational divisions is not
without obstacles though. The issue of sovereignty will need to be
vetted by the Alliance. Under this organization, countries would
surrender a degree of command authority of the contributed units
to the Alliance.17 Because any multilateral agreement regarding
the assignment and employment of the contributed units for
training and deployment precludes the Transfer of Authority (TOA)
requirement, member states may fear the domestic repercussions
of a deployment in support of a contentious security issue. Rather
than face the diplomatic repercussions of withdrawing their forces
during a crisis, it would be more astute not to support the initiative.
The member state ofﬁcer corps would quickly realize that this
fundamental reorganization would negatively affect the size of their
armed forces, career paths, and national prestige. This issue would
also require serious discussion to ensure member states maintain a
military hedge to their nation’s security strategy even if it leads to
some redundancy.
Some states, like the United States, may not relish the idea of
being under foreign commanders, even though its troops have
served under foreign commanders before (since 1776). Furthermore,
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USA

Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Turkey
UK

Aviation

Mountain

Engineer

Div HHC
Armor

Armor

NBC

Signal

Airborne

Gendarme

Engineer

Support
MI

Lt Infantry
Div HHC
Mountain

Aviation

ADA

Artillery

Signal

Aviation
Support
MI

RSTA
Motorized

Mil Police

Div HHC
Motorized

Motorized

Signal

Engineer

Artillery
ADA

Div HHC
Armor

ADA

Armor
MI

Engineer

Signal
Mechanized

Aviation

NBC
Artillery

Support

CJTF 2 (UK)
NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVO
Division
Division
Division
(Light)
(Medium)
(Heavy)
Mil Police

Table 2. Proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure.

Motorized

Aviation

MI
ADA

Motorized

Support

RSTA
Mechanized
Support

Div HHC
Mountain

Gendarme

Artillery

Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway

Signal

Greece

Engineer

Aviation

Mil Police

ADA
Artillery

MI

Germany

Motorized
Mil Police
Div HHC
Motorized
Signal

Motorized

Hungary
Italy

Support
Airborne

ADA

Czech Rep
Denmark
Estonia
France

Bulgaria
Canada

Belgium

Country

CJTF 1 (USA)
NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVO
Division
Division
Division
(Light)
(Medium)
(Heavy)
Artillery
Engineer
MI

Signal

Engineer

Artillery

Aviation

ADA

MI

Mountain

Gendarme

Engineer
Motorized
Engineer

Support

Artillery
Aviation

Support
Mil Police

Motorized

ADA

MI

ADA

Signal

Support

Engineer
NBC

MI

Mil Police
Aviation

Div HHC
Armor

Mechanized

CJTF 3 (GER)
NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVO
Division
Division
Division
(Light)
(Medium)
(Heavy)
Div HHC
Motorized
Lt Infantry
Div HHC
Signal
Artillery
Airborne
RSTA
Armor

reorganizing into multinational divisions is just plain difﬁcult.
The divisional readiness levels would be low for a time while the
division reconciles the language barriers, differing procedures, and
equipment compatibility.
Nonetheless, coalition warfare and by extension the use of
multinational divisions have become a reality in modern warfare
(e.g., the on-going operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan).
Resolving the problems in peacetime is less costly than in the midst
of a conﬂict. Finally, the long-term implications of reorganization
are such that the United States will enjoy an increasing level of active
participation from all member states rather than a select few.
Basing Considerations.
The adoption of nine integrated multinational divisions permits
European countries to replace hundreds of small casernes with nine
large bases. Three criteria shape the establishment of these bases—
location, land, and costs.
The security challenges for Europe no longer lie to the east but
to the south and southeast. The orientation of NATO towards the
Middle East and Africa requires forces that can deploy quickly using
a combination of intertheater aircraft, sealift, and rail movement.
Given the volatility of these outlying regions, deployment times
must be measured in days, not weeks. Turkey, Greece, Romania,
and Bulgaria appear best sited for power projection posture to the
Middle East, whereas Italy, France, and Spain provide superb access
to the Mediterranean Basin and Africa. Of the nine divisions, only
the three heavy divisions require quick access to seaports. The
rest can be located anywhere in Europe that has sufﬁcient airbase
infrastructures. So, the impression that central Europe has no
geostrategic relevance understates the ﬂexibility of airlift.
Availability of sufﬁcient land for a division-sized base with a
contiguous maneuver training area requires the greatest scrutiny
because such bases are essential for readiness. NATO must solicit
competitive land contracts formally among its members. The Alliance
must view this initiative as a long-term project to give member states
time to acquire sufﬁcient space for these bases. This period will
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permit member states to study possible sites which match NATO’s
land requirements, vote on the proposition, and relocate affected
citizens once NATO approves the contract. This monograph does
not advocate the uprooting of entire villages such as practiced by
autocratic regimes. Instead, these governments must recognize the
familial ties to the land and the village. Given the tremendous cost
savings from closing obsolete casernes and the attendant land sales,
governments can compensate the affected citizens above the value
of their property and the cost of relocating (including family burial
plots). This issue is so delicate and fraught with potential excesses,
that NATO (or EU) must establish an oversight commission during
its execution. For member states, two incentives inﬂuence their
desire to win the basing contract: prestige regarding the contribution
to the Alliance, and tremendous positive economic impact of having
NATO bases in their country.
The Anatomy of a Base.
The size, infrastructure, and design of the new NATO bases must
reﬂect the transformational requirements to meet future strategic
challenges. Modern living and working facilities represent only a
portion of the land needed. To preclude the problems associated with
training in Germany, the maneuver training area must be contiguous
to the base and possess sufﬁcient land to permit the unhindered
exercise maneuver of at least two brigade combat teams, plus the
construction of ranges, simulation centers, specialty facilities/areas
(e.g., urban combat, peacekeeping base camp, strong point, and
forest combat), and an airﬁeld. Ultimately, land requirements are
predicated on the type of division. Heavy divisions will need greater
space and more open terrain than light and medium divisions, so
member states can bid on the type division that is most adaptive to
their landscape. Hence, an armored division would be well-suited
in the open expanses of Spain, and a light division quite comfortable
in the mountainous regions of Greece and Italy.
Due to the size of a heavy division base, the CJTF headquarters
is ideally suited for co-location or in the vicinity. The location of
the airﬁeld permits the DCFTF to deploy quickly, and the large
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maneuver training area permits combined joint training exercises
with its echelons above division units, and elements of its light,
medium, and heavy divisions.
Large maneuver training areas accommodate multiple units
training in noncontiguous operations, which characterize Rapid
Decisive Operations. Modern ranges—from small arms to combined
arms to joint arms—permit the full array of ground and air units to
exercise capabilities in a permissive environment. As recent conﬂicts
have demonstrated, conducting joint operations only during combat
operations is rife with hazards and unintended consequences. Stateof-the-art simulation centers for weapons training, driver training,
command and control training, and war gaming provide tremendous
beneﬁts at low cost.
As conﬂict grows in complexity, honing combat skills in
specialty facilities pays high dividends. Conﬂict trends reveal that
urban terrain will ﬁgure more prominently in future operations.
Combat training and security and stability operations in urban
terrain are absolutely critical. Ideally, any abandoned villages as a
result of citizen relocation should be incorporated into the maneuver
training area. A prime example of a premier urban combat center
is Bonnland, Germany, which was an actual village prior to World
War II. Bonnland’s town grid, construction and layout of buildings,
underground system, and surrounding areas give unequaled
training beneﬁts and realism to urban combat training. Attempting
to build such villages from scratch would likely be too expensive to
be worthwhile. For realism, cost savings, and training beneﬁts, the
conversion of an existing village is the best solution.
A peacekeeping base camp permits units to train in a crisis
environment with concurrent training in immediate action drills,
deploying a quick reaction force, operating check points, clearing
hasty mineﬁelds, and conducting control of civilians on the
battleﬁeld.
Reserving an area for strong points permits soldiers to experience
the tremendous value of defending and the excruciating difﬁculty in
reducing entrenchments. To preclude units from gaining too great
a familiarity of the layout, strong points should be dismantled and
the area leveled after each training exercise. This approach permits
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units to vary the design of strong points as well as training leaders
and soldiers on the planning and preparation of a strong point.
The forest combat area familiarizes units with the difﬁculties of
operating in wooded terrain. This highly perishable skill is usually
tested upon the ﬁrst enemy contact in combat with devastating
results. U.S. units at least have the opportunity to train in such
terrain at their home station maneuver training areas and at the
Joint Readiness Training Center. European units rarely have the
opportunity to train in such areas because they are only available
in civilian sectors and are subject to environmental restrictions.
On military reservations, the military can be good stewards of the
environment and still receive valuable training. The byword should
be “No more Huertgen Forests.”
A C-17 capable airﬁeld would serve several purposes. Naturally,
it would serve for airlifting the NRF, DJFT, and HRF to a crisis
region, and it would serve as a staging area for training involving
army aviation and air squadrons. Ground units would also use the
airﬁeld for forced entry and hostage rescue training.
Integrated multinational divisions offer numerous intangibles
that enhance cohesion and a sense of community. Living and
training in one location permit allies interpersonal contact as a
matter of routine. This proximity fosters immersion in English
(NATO’s ofﬁcial language), training procedures, and cooperation
among partner units. The current practice of major training
exercises conducted infrequently may have value at the higher
echelons of command, but has limited value at lower levels because
skills acquired from collective and combined training are perishable.
If not conducted routinely within the division training management
cycle, they disappear quickly.
The construction of family housing and supporting infrastructure
is not a frivolous or proﬂigate expense. Military communities
form unique bonds, which enhance division cohesion. The daily
interaction of allied and U.S. families will lead to a quickening of
integration through the friendships formed. Frequent contacts
among families, as well as exposure to Armed Forces Network (TV)
and radio improve language skills, ease the cultural adjustment
period and create informal lines of communication among soldiers.
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Because the United States would have a reduced force of four
brigades and headquarters staffs, its family footprint would be
relatively small, and an assignment to NATO would not become
a hardship tour for married soldiers with the family problems that
occur when a military spouse is deployed over an extended period.
Partnership extends beyond the gates of the base. The reputation
of NATO begins or is enhanced in the local community. Mutual
participation in base open houses, local festivals, and other special
events create deeper relations between host nation citizens and the
military. Employing the local populace for citizens in the battleﬁeld
training provides a readily available resource at minimum cost.
Investment in these training complexes seems cost prohibitive.
To reiterate, modern living and maintenance facilities and a nearby
maneuver training area provide tremendous ﬁnancial savings
and more time available for training. The maintenance and
operating costs of these facilities would be a fraction of the current
maintenance and renovation costs associated with antiquated, preWorld War II casernes in Germany. The proximity of the facilities
to the contiguous training area obviates the costs associated with
rail and convoy movement. Signiﬁcantly, units need not spend
the hundreds of man-hours coordinating in-processing and
outprocessing currently associated with the major training centers in
Germany. NATO members share associated costs (the United States
pays for 25 percent of common costs).18 Moreover, the tremendous
cost savings associated with smaller and fewer units make these
centers fungible. Since the U.S. presence in Europe is enduring, the
investment in modern facilities makes economic sense.
Rather than accepting the visceral arguments that new NATO
bases are too intrusive and cost prohibitive, one should acknowledge
that the consolidation of modern facilities and training areas at
only nine bases saves time, resources, and money in the long term.
Instead of the cluster of casernes with distant scattered maneuver
training areas in Germany, units can enjoy superb, immediate,
recurrent combined-joint training with responsible impact on the
environment and little intrusion on the citizens of the host country.
Stationing integrated multinational divisions at nine European bases
permits the United States to reduce its force contribution without
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marring the sensibilities of U.S. commitment to the Alliance.
The operative question is whether this restructuring of NATO is
adaptable to the NATO command and force structure. If it is not,
the concept becomes impractical. The recent reforms, following the
November 21-22, 2002, Prague Summit, have set the conditions for
this operational restructuring.
The Streamlined Military Command Structure.
Considering that NATO’s military command structure during
the height of the Cold War stood at 78 major headquarters, the recent
reorganization to just eleven major headquarters is remarkable (see
Figure 1).19
The redesignation of the strategic commands as Atlantic
Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations
(ACO) reveals a greater commitment to transformation and
expeditionary capabilities.20
Formerly the Allied Command Europe (ACE), ACO has
streamlined into three major joint forces commands, each with an
expeditionary posture. Joint Headquarters Command is located in
Lisbon and has assumed the operational command function of the
former SACLANT with the capability to form a maritime CJTF.21
Joint Forces Command North and South integrate their land, air, and
naval component commands into functional joint forces. Between
them, they can form a land-based CJTF.22 For the ﬁrst time in its
history, NATO is structured and beginning to think as a combinedjoint expeditionary force.
NATO’s International Military Staff conceives a new force
structure that permits units “to rapidly deploy to crisis areas and
remain sustainable, be it within or outside NATO’s territory, in
support of both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations.”23 Since
the majority of NATO’s current ground forces are unwieldy and
lack the crucial strategic mobility, the military staff’s criteria for
highly deployable tactical forces with requisite tactical and strategic
mobility are essential to expeditionary operations.24 Multinationality
characterizes another key feature of the new force structure,
permitting partner countries and international organizations a
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Figure 1. NATO Military Command Structure.

deﬁnitive role in NATO operations while exhibiting to potential
threats “solidarity and its political cohesiveness.”25
Because the NATO force structure is the force provider for the
land-based CJTF, it should provide the CJTF with its expeditionary
character. In this capacity, it falls short. NATO basically has
repackaged the tactical units into high and low readiness forces
without really improving their tactical and strategic mobility. The
High Readiness Forces-Land (HRF-L) ﬂuctuates in size from the
Spanish division-equivalent corps to the 10-division Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC) with deployment criteria of 90 days or less
upon alert. Since the two Deployable Combined Air Operations
Centers (DCAOC) and the High Readiness Forces-Maritime have the
capability to deploy within hours and days, the HRF-L becomes the
bottleneck. The Forces of Lower Readiness are intended to reinforce
and sustain an operation if needed.26 But, if the various divisions of
the HRF-L are insufﬁcient, how would two to four more divisions
of the Forces of Lower Readiness-Land (FLR-L) be enough? They
would not, and hence only give the impression that other member
states are active participants. In a serious crisis, the HRF-L would
provide the time for member states to mobilize their armed forces.
The multinational character of the HRF-L is suspect as well.
A multinational corps is a mere pretense to true multinational
participation. Its subordinate units remain national by organization
and are geographically separated. Since integrated multinational
divisions provide all the necessary elements for participation and
burden sharing, and since the organization of CJTFs into light,
medium, and heavy divisions enhance rapid deployment, it is logical
that the NATO force structure should comprise nine integrated
multinational divisions.
The NATO Response Force.
Critics could point out that the NATO Response Force (NRF)
provides the NATO force structure with its expeditionary component
with a deployment readiness of 5-30 days (see Figure 2).27 With an
initial strength of 5,000 by October 2003 and a target of 20,000 by
2006, the NRF is a remarkable organization and would ﬁt perfectly
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with the recommended NATO 3-3 Force Structure.28 NATO’s criteria
for the NRF were precise:
a technologically advanced, ﬂexible, deployable, inter-operable and
sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move
quickly to wherever needed. It will serve two distinct but mutually
reinforcing purposes. First, it will provide high-readiness force able to
move quickly to wherever it may be required to carry out the full range
of Alliance missions. Second, the NRF will be a catalyst for focusing and
promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities and,
more generally, for their continuing transformation to meet evolving
security challenges.29

The NRF will be able to act independently or as the initial entry force
for the HRF and will be self-sustaining for 30 days.30

Figure 2. NATO’s Graduated Response Forces.
In consonance with NATO’s new missions, the NRF missions
include crisis response (including peacekeeping), support of counterterrorism operations, consequence management (including chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear events and humanitarian
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crises), peace enforcement, embargo operations (maritime, initial
land, and no-ﬂy zone), initial entry force, demonstrative force pack
(quick response operations), and noncombatant evacuation.31 As
is apparent, NATO’s missions not only overlap the EU Petersberg
Tasks but also have the robust capability to execute them.
The tip of NATO’s spear is the Very High Readiness Force,
a battalion-sized joint task force (see Figure 3).32 It forms the
vanguard of the NRF’s initial entry brigade with a potent forced
entry capability. NATO discovered that the CJTF was too unwieldy
a headquarters to deploy and thus developed the Deployable Joint
Task Force (DJTF) concept. So even though the original NATO plan
is to form CJTFs from subordinate JFCCs, DJTFs will become the
command and control for the NRF and by extension the HRF (see
Figure 4).33

Figure 3. Very High Readiness Force.
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Figure 4. Command and Control.
The signiﬁcant and unnecessary problem with the current force
structure arises from the issue of force generation. The generated
forces for the NRF originate from the HRF ground, naval, and air
forces. NRF force generation is a two-phased process initiated a
year prior to units assuming the duty. The initial force generation
conference creates the generic force in accordance with the Combined
Joint Statement of Requirement. The ﬁnal conference determines
the speciﬁc make up of the force upon activation and once the JFC
mission analysis tailors the force.34
Even though NATO is well-versed in force generation, the
process is involved, and may require artful negotiations with
Alliance members to pledge speciﬁc forces for the NRF. Force
generation conferences resemble negotiations because Alliance
members may be reluctant to contribute forces or opt to contribute
forces that are unsuited or not needed for a task force (e.g., infantry
versus engineer units).35 Such a process requires months to garner
the necessary forces and is ill-suited for tailoring high readiness
forces for crisis response. Force generation is likely to remain a
contentious issue as long as the Alliance maintains its current form
of segregated divisions.
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The NATO 3-3 Force Structure greatly reduces the tedious force
generation process. If a member state declines to participate in an
operation, the redundancies provided by the 3-3 Force Structure
permit the replacement of the unit. With a ready-made force
postured already for expeditionary operations, the CJTF command
and staff generates the forces for the NRF quickly, efﬁciently, and
most important, equitably.
NATO has made great strides with reforms as it postures to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. Certainly, no other security
organization exists in Europe to compete with the Alliance. Given
the tremendous almost revolutionary drive of NATO towards
reform since the end of the Cold War, continued reform is expected.
The ﬁnal step lies in the adoption of the 3-3 Force Structure. With
such a force, NATO will achieve assured expeditionary capabilities.
Conclusions.
As it reconﬁgures its ground forces in Europe, the United States
must consider the ramiﬁcations of its decisions. If reconﬁguration
results in a military divorce between the United States and Europe,
the Alliance will be doomed. Prominent ﬁgures on both sides of
the Atlantic would like nothing better than to see the demise of the
Alliance in pursuit of their own agendas. A rash decision regarding
the basing of U.S. ground forces would only serve the purposes of
NATO’s opponents.
A withdrawal of U.S. ground forces would create the impression that the United States is no longer serious about the Alliance.
Alleged pan-Europeanists would use this action as a pretext to
replace the United States with the EU RRF. It would only be a matter
of time before the SACEUR is replaced by a European commander.
The rotation of U.S. divisions on a yearly basis would likewise create
the impression of a diminished U.S. commitment to the Alliance.
Worse, the execution of this scheme would be too disruptive to
the U.S. Army to be practical. The United States experimented
with a similar rotational system during the Cold War, and it was
discontinued due to the difﬁculties in implementation. The proposed
NATO 3-3 Force Structure permits the United States to downsize its
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presence in Europe without undermining the Alliance.
The proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure permits the
development of a long-term plan for dealing with the lingering
problems of collective contributions, force generation, and basing.
Downsizing the Alliance to nine integrated multinational divisions
not only makes budgeting and burden-sharing sense, it also permits
all Alliance members to make meaningful contributions and take
shared risks in security matters. This initiative also permits the
United States to downsize its ground presence to about four brigades,
a Special Forces component, and two major headquarters—a size of
about 10,000-12,000 personnel.
If the Alliance does not adopt the integrated multinational
division concept, the European side of the Alliance will continue as
a junior partner with diminishing contributions. Moreover, without
these divisions, Europeans will view the downsizing of U.S. ground
units as another example of U.S. disengagement from Europe. The
NATO 3-3 Force Structure provides an immediate source for force
generation, particularly combat support and combat service support
units, which the Alliance lacks in sufﬁcient numbers. Moreover,
NATO can conduct long-term deployments without over-extending
itself or over-using key units and personnel.
As a long-term initiative, NATO needs to realign its basing
concept to permit swifter access to out-of-area regions and the
consolidation of land and resources. Division-sized bases with
living, working, and training facilities, as opposed to hundreds of
small casernes scattered throughout Europe, enhance unit readiness,
interoperability, and cohesion within the Alliance.
Recommendations:
• Adoption of the NATO 3-3 Force Structure.
• Establishment of a NATO working group to explore nine
division-sized bases.
• Adoption of a public awareness campaign to inform member
states of the need for a NATO 3-3 Force Structure and divisionsized bases.
• U.S. withdrawal of political support of, and a priori support of,
the use of NATO assets for the EU Rapid Reaction Force.
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The United States can have its cake and eat it, too, without
appearing unilateralist. The United States needs a power security
partner, and any decision which endangers that need will be
to the U.S. detriment. The implementation of these long-term
recommendations will provide the Alliance with a powerful,
sustainable expeditionary force and signiﬁcantly ease the U.S.
security burden.
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